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The most complex, beautiful, and longstanding tradition in the world 
is the great and continuous four-billion-year-old web of life, what Richard 
Dawkins calls “the river out of Eden” (1995). Thirty years ago he showed 
that the existence and interplay of replicators, entities that are able to copy 
themselves, are sufficient to explain, in broad terms, the workings of 
evolutionary biology. Dawkins, whose focus was the biological gene, also 
noted that there is another replicator on earth besides the gene—the “meme” 
(1976:203-15). A meme is the simplest unit of cultural replication; it is 
whatever is transmitted when one person imitates, consciously or 
unconsciously, another (208).1 In this essay I will show how an 
understanding of the interactions of memes can do for culture what the 
identification of “selfish genes” (Dawkins 1976), “extended phenotypes” 
(Dawkins 1982), and “cooperative genes” (Ridley 2001) did for biology.  
Meme theory can explain the workings of several well-known and much 
discussed aspects of oral traditions: traditional referentiality, anaphora, and 
the use of repeated metrical patterns. All three phenomena, different as they 
are, can be understood as arising from the operations of the same underlying 
processes of repetition and pattern-recognition explained by meme-theory.
2
 
 
 
 
                                                
1
 Robert Aunger goes to great lengths to determine whether or not a theorized 
meme is in fact a replicator (in his view, replicators must have “causation, similarity, 
information transfer, and duplication”), eventually concluding that memes are in fact 
replicators (2002:213-17). Although I doubt that everything that has been claimed as a 
meme is in fact a replicator, the phenomena I am discussing—traditions and their 
component parts—are indeed replicators in Aunger’s sense.  
 
2
 I develop this theory at much greater length with an expanded discussion of the 
philosophical and literary-theoretical contexts in Drout 2006.   
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Memes and Repetition 
 
When one person imitates a behavior of another, a meme has managed 
to replicate itself by being copied from one human mind to another. The 
classic example of a meme is a tune, such as “Happy Birthday to You,” sung 
by one person and heard and repeated by another.
3
 Within the context of a 
given culture, some memes are better at getting copied than others.
4
 Often 
the memes that are best at getting copied are those that are most effective at 
combining with other memes, and memes can be parasitic, commensal, or 
symbiotic. Replicators, competition (there is some finite limit to the number 
of memes, if only because we have not world enough and time; there is a 
limited number of human minds, and these last for finite amounts of time), 
and variation create a situation of “universal Darwinism” (Dawkins 
1983:403). The process of natural selection will ensure that, given enough 
time, those memes that are better at getting copied will end up outnumbering 
those that are not. Memes will evolve for improved success at being copied 
because (by definition) those that are better at getting copied will 
differentially replace those that are not: all the memes in existence are 
dependent upon the same finite resources. The eventual result of such 
differential reproduction is an ecosystem of competing and cooperating 
memes—a culture—populated by memes that are exquisitely adapted to it.
5
 
An analysis of the design and engineering principles of memes, in this wider 
context of the memetic ecosystem in which they exist, would be a first step 
                                                
3
  “Happy Birthday to You” is a meme, but it can also be seen as an aggregation 
of the memes for the individual words in the song working in partnership with the already 
established memes of the English language. Likewise the tune itself is a meme, but so is 
each smaller verse. “Happy Birthday to You” could thus technically be called a “meme-
plex,” a complex of memes (Hull 1982). “Meme-plex” is an abbreviation of Dawkins’ 
“co-adapted meme complex” (1976:212-13). The abbreviation was apparently developed 
by H. Speel in an as yet unpublished conference paper; see Blackmore (1999:19), who 
gives the “Happy Birthday” example. “Meme-plex” and “meme” are thus different names 
for the same sorts of entities, and to avoid proliferating jargon I will use “meme” in all 
cases. 
 
4
 Edward Shils argues that “traditions are not independently self-reproductive or 
self-elaborating. Only living, knowing, desiring human beings can enact them and reenact 
them and modify them” (1981:14). But this view is either true only in a trivial sense (and 
perhaps not even trivially true, because some animals appear to enact traditions) or 
mistaken. 
 
5
 This analysis is consistent with F. A. Hayek’s discussion of tradition (1945). 
Peter Medawar also argues for analyzing tradition in terms of selection pressure (1961). 
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towards a cultural poetics that is wholly materialist and thus subject, at every 
level, to testing, falsification, and modification.
 6
   
A tradition is an unbroken train of identical, non-instinctual behaviors 
that have been repeated after the same recurring antecedent conditions.
7
 The 
first time a behavior is enacted cannot be a tradition, but the second time can 
be, and the first enactment is then retrospectively defined as the origin of the 
tradition.
8
 Repetition is the “same” action engaged in upon more than one 
occasion, but defining “same” is philosophically problematic: the more fine-
grained the focus, the more difficult it is to define something as “same” (see 
Dennett 1984). Nevertheless, we seem to be able to recognize and agree 
upon recognizing “same” actions even when we cannot rigorously define 
them in philosophical terms.
9
 For the purposes of this argument such 
consensus understandings of “same” are sufficient.
10
 
In memetic terms, a tradition is a combination of several smaller 
memes. The traditional behavior can be seen as one meme; let us call it 
actio. The response to the given antecedent condition that triggers the 
traditional behavior is another meme that enables the first meme; let us call 
this recognitio.
 
The tradition is then, the combination of these two memes:  
recognitio—“every spring equinox, enact actio”—and actio—“sing the 
equinox song.” The proto-tradition (recogitio+actio) is: “every spring 
equinox sing the equinox song.”   
                                                
6
 I say “first step” because untangling a cultural poetics is likely to be quite 
difficult. For one thing, if culture does evolve via selection and evolution of memes, it 
may not be very easy to fathom their underlying engineering principles (Miller 2000): 
“Genetic algorithms…often produce solutions that work, but one cannot quite understand 
how or why they work” because genetic algorithms “break the link between innovation 
and analysis that has been considered a fundamental principle of modern engineering.”  
 
7
 Traditions can be characterized mathematically by Markov chains: the continued 
maintenance of the tradition depends upon a series of successful enactments of the 
behavior in question (Feller 1957:338-96).  
 
8
 Note that here I disagree with Shils, who argues that a pattern of behavior must 
be repeated three times to be a tradition (1981:15). It is not clear that one additional 
repetition makes something a tradition that would otherwise not be one. The key point to 
keep in mind is that a tradition is defined retrospectively.  
 
9
 The problem of “repetition” is intertwined with the problem of “identity,” 
usually abbreviated in the philosophical literature as the problem of “The Ship of 
Theseus,” analyzed by many philosophers, but perhaps most famously by Hobbes in 
Elements of Philosophy. I recognize the immensity of the argument and set it aside. 
 
10
 I discuss the philosophical problems in detail in Drout (2006:24-6), where I use 
Wittgensteinian “family resemblances” to provide a possible solution.    
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What converts a simple response to a condition into a tradition is the 
addition of a third meme to the complex that provides an explanation for the 
behavior. Let us call this justificatio: “because singing the equinox song 
makes the fields fruitful.” The full complex for the traditional behavior 
(recognitio+actio+justificatio)
11
 is: “every spring equinox sing the equinox 
song because singing the equinox song makes the fields fruitful.” This 
recognitio+actio+justificatio complex is the fundamental structure from 
which a tradition evolves.
12
 
A proto-tradition could easily arise in a culture from trial and error, 
and spread widely due to the general tendencies of humans to repeat actions 
that appear to lead to successful outcomes, to imitate others who are 
successful, and to teach valuable information to members of a younger 
generation.
13
 Recognitio, actio, and justificatio are each differently sensitive 
to transmission error.
14
 If recognitio (recognize the antecedent condition of 
“at the spring equinox”) mutates, such change has a relatively good chance 
of not degrading the fitness of the overall meme. For example, if recognitio 
is modified in transmission so that “at the spring equinox” is replaced by “at 
both the spring or fall equinoxes,” the overall inclusive fitness of the meme-
                                                
11
 I believe these terms are sufficiently close to their English equivalents to be 
relatively easy to remember and distinguish. While it is true that justificatio is later Latin 
and recognitio in this sense is earlier Latin, the greater familiarity of recognitio over 
recognosco seems a good reason to keep the term. I have chosen Latin rather than 
English terms because calling something a “justification” would be a kind of rhetorical 
cheating.  
 
12
 This tripartite view of tradition is not incompatible with Popper’s two-part 
description. Popper notes that traditions are transmitted with a “silent accompanying text 
of a second-order character” (1965:127). 
 
13
 In The Descent of Man Darwin discusses the way that imitation would spread 
“the habitual practice of each new art,” and would thus be linked to the development of 
culture through natural selection (Ridley 1987:151). 
 
14
 For the fundamental theory of information transmission and degradation, see 
Shannon and Weaver 1949:34-48. See also Khinchin 1957. Here I part company from 
Aunger, who insists that “information is physical” (2002:136-58, 193). Aunger’s use of 
quantum theory is provocative, and for a somewhat similar discussion see Pesic 2002. 
However, my reading of the mathematical literature and my discussions with 
mathematicians have convinced me that the majority position in information theory is 
that information is “substrate neutral.” Turing’s development of the “Universal 
Computing Machine” (now called the “Universal Turing Machine”) seems to support this 
side of the argument (Turing 1936-37). 
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plex may be improved, especially if the new recognitio is easier to 
remember.
15
 
Actio, on the other hand, is less likely to mutate successfully. 
Although fitness-improving mutation does of course happen, positive 
mutation is comparatively unlikely because random deviations from an 
adaptively effective practice are likely to be less adaptive than the original 
practice. Actio, then, appears to be somewhat more sensitive to mutation 
than recognitio because the ways in which it can vary are more likely to lead 
to a decrease in fitness.  
Justificatio, however, can mutate substantially without necessarily 
damaging the fitness of the overall meme-plex. Humans can invent a 
multitude of explanations for their actions even when these explanations 
have nothing to do either causally or historically with the action in question. 
Thus there seems to be strong selection pressure on justificatio to mutate in 
ways that lead to a decrease in the possibility of individuals ignoring the 
entire meme-plex. If we take a meme’s-eye view of the situation, we see that 
the stronger a form of justificatio is, the more likely the entire meme is to be 
preserved.
16
 Conditions that affect justificatio could also threaten the 
reproduction of the entire meme. For example, if the meme is enacted but 
the crops do not thrive, the “fitness” of the meme-plex suffers; people will 
be less likely to act upon the instructions if their very reason for so acting 
(given in the justificatio) is not borne out by experience. Following John L. 
Austin (1979) and John Searle (1998), who follows him, we can call this the 
Word-to-World fit condition.
17
 
Word-to-World fit implies the existence of a world that includes the 
physical world as well as social and cultural worlds, and it also must include 
the weltanschauung held by individuals by means of whom the tradition 
                                                
15
 Dawkins (1986:99-100) discusses how the 13- and 17-year life cycles of 
cicadas serve to protect the adults against predators, because all emerge at the same time 
(“swamping” their predators with more food than they can consume). The 13- and 17-
year life cycles (and there are no 14-, 15-, or 16-year life cycles) seem to have evolved 
because 13 and 17, being prime numbers, are not multiples of shorter (say, 2-, 3-, 4- or 5-
year) life cycles. Memes whose recognitio components mutated to unusual periodicities 
would be unlikely to be remembered. 
 
16
 There are limits, however, to how imperative a justificatio can become. If there 
is selection pressure for memes to become more and more emphatic, then human minds 
will evolve defenses against such extreme positions lest a single, imperative meme 
capture the entire organism to that organism’s detriment. See Dennett 2003:150-56. 
 
17
 See also Anscombe 1957:56-57. 
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meme is attempting to replicate.
18
 Note that if a justificatio is sufficiently 
vague, it will more frequently fit the world than if it is precise.
19
 We could 
expect, then, that there would be selection pressure not only to make 
justificatios more emphatic, but also more vague. However, extreme 
specificity in justificatio would make a meme-plex more fit by making the 
justificatio more convincing; at the same time that specificity would risk the 
Word-to-World conflict that could reduce the meme’s fitness. Successful 
memes must negotiate a balancing act between specificity and vagueness. 
The need to balance between these two poles creates the opportunity 
for the Universal Tradition Meme to replace the specifics of any given 
justificatio with a new explanation: “because we have always done so” 
(“because it is traditional to do so”). At first the Universal Tradition Meme 
appears to be a variation of vagueness and subject to the same difficulties (a 
vague explanation may lose out to a specific one if the two are competing). 
The Universal Tradition Meme is indeed more vague than any specified 
justificatio, which is why it is unlikely to out-compete a narrowly specific 
justificatio when a meme-plex first evolves.
20
 But the Universal Tradition 
Meme should, over time, out-compete a more specified justificatio because 
the more iterations of transmission of the meme, the more true the Universal 
Tradition Meme becomes: it is more specifically true because the pattern has 
been enacted previously and thus can withstand detailed Word-to-World 
comparison.  
The Universal Tradition Meme makes a given meme more likely to be 
replicated; thus those memes that are able to be joined to the Universal 
Tradition Meme are more likely themselves to be replicated. Once the 
Universal Tradition Meme has evolved in a culture, therefore, it will cause 
                                                
18
 For a good discussion of the interaction of the constraints of the physical world 
with culture (real-world constraints are “non-negotiable and universal”), see Vincenti 
2000:174. Pascal Boyer argues that “for anthropologists, the fact that something is culture 
is the very reason it does not vary that much. Not everything is equally likely to be 
transmitted, because the templates in the mind filter information from other people and 
build predictable structures out of that information” (2001:47, his emphasis). I agree, but 
would note that Boyer’s conception needs to be linked to the physical constraints of the 
real world as well as those of the cultural world and the individual human psyche. Word-
to-World fit subsumes these multiple categories.  
 
19
 A vague justificatio allows for a wider range of interpretation, and thus more 
possibilities of “fit” than does a specific justificatio. 
 
20
 On the first or second iteration of a meme, the Universal Tradition Meme 
should not work as a justificatio because it will not fit the world (“we obviously haven’t 
always done this new thing”). 
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the agglomeration of more and more memes together into larger and larger 
complexes of tradition. But the Universal Tradition Meme is not the 
culmination of the cultural evolution of a tradition.
21
 There is a 
straightforward evolutionary progression of justificatios from “we have 
always done so” to an unconscious sublimation of that idea, eventually 
reaching the point where the traditional behavior itself becomes interpreted 
(when even noticed) as part of the cultural identity of the individuals who 
engage in it.
22
 We can call such an unconscious sublimation the 
Unconscious Imperative and recognize it as the ultimate telos (goal) of the 
Universal Tradition Meme. But the Universal Tradition Meme can always be 
reinstated if the Unconscious Imperative fails: if someone were to question 
an Unconscious Imperative action, a participant in the culture could reply 
with the Universal Tradition Meme: “we have always done so.” Thus, while 
all traditions are not accessed self-consciously (if they have attained 
Unconscious Imperative status), they all have the capability of becoming 
self-conscious at any time and their justificatios then again being the 
Universal Tradition Meme.    
Repeated actions will tend toward the Universal Tradition Meme for 
their justificatios (because the longer a practice continues, the better the 
Word-to-World fit of the Universal Tradition Meme justificatio for the 
practice will be), and therefore repeated actions will tend to become 
traditions. Given the fallible nature of human memory, it is not surprising 
that it takes only a few repetitions of some behaviors to generate the idea of 
tradition (that is, to push the justificatio towards the Universal Tradition 
Meme). This process may appear paradoxical, because the fallible nature of 
long-term, distributed memory would seem to lead to the loss of traditions. 
But in fact the combination of fallible distributed long-term memory with 
the ability of individuals to recognize patterns quickly, and with the human 
tendency to repeat actions that have had previous success—the “stick with a 
winner” tendency, leads to the creation and maintenance of traditions.   
Repetition thus not only leads to stability, but generates the impression that a 
repeated practice has always been repeated. This idea in turn creates 
continuity, because we are more likely to see ourselves as being 
fundamentally like them if we believe that individuals in the past were 
                                                
21
 Although it appears to be an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (Maynard Smith 
1982:10-27). 
 
22
 Cf. Lord 1960:220: “For it is of the necessary nature of tradition that it seek and 
maintain stability, that it preserve itself. And this tenacity springs neither from a 
perverseness, nor from an abstract principle of absolute art, but from a desperately 
compelling conviction that what tradition is preserving is the very means of attaining life 
and happiness.”  
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performing the same actions as we are today. Repetition and also identity are 
thus projected back into the past and forward into the future because 
participants in a tradition also imagine their descendants continuing their 
practices.   
The effects of tradition and its associated repetitions on culture are 
substantial. Repetition improves the mnemonic retention of information.  
Repeated memes, therefore, are more likely to be mnemonically stable than 
unrepeated ones. The more a tradition is repeated (that is, the shorter the 
intervals between repetitions) the more likely it is to be mnemonically 
retained, because if repetition is mnemonically effective, frequent repetition 
(within some limits) is even more so.   
Repetition reinforces not only the justificatio component of a tradition 
(by improving its Word-to-World fit as it evolves towards the Universal 
Tradition Meme) but also the recognitio component, because a repeated 
recognitio is more likely to be entered into and retrieved from long-term 
memory. Repetition creates patterns, and human brains, among their other 
talents, are sublime pattern-recognizers. The combination of the patterns 
created by repetition with the human ability to recognize patterns means that 
in a culture that includes repeated traditions, information (memes) may be 
encoded and transmitted in significantly compressed form. Memes can also 
be retrieved from incomplete or noisy data, allowing traditionally encoded 
patterns to be transmitted and received in many different situations.  
 
 
Traditional Referentiality 
 
Once a meme has been stored in a person’s memory, and if that meme 
is part of some kind of repeated pattern, it can be called back into conscious 
perception by some smaller critical portion of the meme. A poem could be 
invoked by one or two lines; for example, the phrase “’twas the night before 
Christmas” may bring up the memory of the entire poem. If the short 
sequence that operates as a cueing mechanism is distinctive enough, this 
triggering meme can be very short. In the case of “’twas the night before 
Christmas,” for many people “’twas” is probably sufficient.
23
 
The triggering or cuing meme (the “’twas”) is called, in oral 
traditional studies,
24
 the “traditional referent.” A traditional referent invokes 
                                                
23
 If “’twas” does not immediately bring to mind the correct poem, it at least 
narrows down the search space to either this poem or “Jabberwocky.” 
 
24
 I recognize that the exact contours of oral traditional theory are a matter of 
some contention. For the purpose of this argument I invoke the theory as originated by 
Milman Parry and Albert Lord, summed up by John Miles Foley (1988), and having its 
 A MEME-BASED APPROACH TO ORAL TRADITION  
 
277
the much larger meme complex with which it is associated by the process of 
metonymy: the part stands for the whole.
25
 Thus the use of a specific 
formula or type-scene (a repeated traditional meme) can invoke, pars pro 
toto, “a context enormously larger and more echoic than the text or the work 
itself” (Foley 1991:6-8). A formulaic epithet or “tag-line” like “grey-eyed 
Athena” or “Hector of the glancing helm” invokes not merely one attribute 
of a well-known character, but that character’s entire persona as developed 
throughout the epic corpus (Foley 1995:5).  
A functioning tradition consists of a set of aggregated actios all 
utilizing the Universal Tradition Meme (or its unconscious telos) as their 
justificatio components and all using the same (or harmonized) recognitios. 
Thus the traditional meme-plex exists not only as the historical fact of a 
series of repeated actions, but also as the memory of those repeated actions. 
Because one significant problem for traditions is to ensure that they are 
brought to mind (that is, that the recognitio components are triggered so as 
to enact the tradition), features that would more frequently bring the memory 
of the tradition to conscious perception would work to make the tradition 
more likely to be enacted and re-enacted. Traditional referentiality is just 
such a structure. It works as a meta-recognitio component: although the 
traditional referent does not in itself trigger the tradition, it triggers 
knowledge of the tradition and thus makes that tradition more likely to be 
replicated, and, in bringing the tradition to mind, strengthens the association 
between the tradition and the traditional referent.
26
 A traditional referent, 
then, which is most likely some portion of the conglomerated actio 
components of the traditional meme complex, can bring into conscious 
perception the entire complex. Therefore traditional referentiality is not only 
a by-product of the repetition generated by tradition, but also serves to 
reinforce the tradition itself. The generation of this cycle by the structure and 
                                                                                                                                            
current state represented by Foley 1990, 1991a, and 1995. Oral theory now focuses on the 
ways that orally composed verbal artforms are created and how they make meaning for 
the “readers who hear” them (to use Foley’s evocative phrase), that is, those who are 
participants in the tradition (Foley 1991b). See also Foley 2002.  
 
25
 Cf. Foley 1991a:7: “Traditional referentiality, then, entails the invoking of a 
context that is enormously larger and more echoic than the text or work itself, that brings 
the lifeblood of generations of poems and performances to the individual performance or 
text. Each element in the phraseology or narrative thematics stands not simply for that 
singular instance but for the plurality and multiformity that are beyond the reach of 
textualization.”  
 
26
 The traditional referent does not merely repeat the networks of inherent 
meaning; it recreates them (Foley 1991a:10). 
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elements of tradition, repetition, and traditional referentiality explains in part 
the ubiquity and persistence of traditions.  
The ability of the traditional referent to summon to working memory a 
much larger complex of memes is enabled by repetition: for a component 
part to become a traditional referent it must be a recognizable part of some 
whole, and the best way for the association of the part to the whole to be 
made is for the whole to have been repeated. Thus traditional referentiality 
enables some small subset of a larger meme to awaken the referent to 
conscious memory in the mind of a participant in the tradition. The ability of 
the traditional referent to summon entire complexes of memes by metonymy 
means that the use of traditional referents is an enormously effective means 
of communication (provided that both interlocutors are participants in the 
tradition).
27
  
Oral theory has analyzed the aesthetic effects of traditional referents, 
but for our current purposes it is more important to note that the combination 
of traditional referentiality with the repetition inherent in traditions and with 
the human brain’s ability to recognize patterns leads to an incredibly rich 
and complex network of associations.
28
 Within this network not only 
traditional meme-plexes, but also subsidiary networks of traditional referents 
(at times decoupled from the traditions they represent, because not every 
individual is equally participatory in every tradition) can create associations 
between themselves and other sets of traditions and their referents. The 
brain’s pattern-finding abilities can also recognize patterns in these meta-
networks, and the same process of metonymic traditional referentiality can 
in turn invoke these associations.   
The most significant problem for the analysis of networks of 
traditional associations is the identification of traditional referents. Any 
feature of the meme can conceivably become a traditional referent as long as 
this feature is repeated and is susceptible to being recognized by the brain’s 
                                                
27
 Foley calls this process “communicative economy” (1995:93-95). Note that the 
communicative economy of oral tradition does not violate any of Shannon’s rules about 
the transmission of information (Shannon and Weaver 1949) because the units of 
information have previously been transmitted over long periods of time. The triggering 
meme simply recalls them to memory. See also Aunger 2002:255-67. 
 
28
 I am avoiding using Foley’s term “immanence” to describe these networks. 
Foley is concerned to describe the way that the networks convey meaning while I am at 
this point only discussing the way they are formed. It is nevertheless worth quoting 
Foley’s definition of immanence as “the set of metonymic, associated meanings 
institutionally delivered and received through a dedicated idiom or register either during 
or on the authority of traditional oral performance” (1995:7). 
 
 A MEME-BASED APPROACH TO ORAL TRADITION  
 
279
pattern-recognition mechanisms.
29
 Trying to construct a universal definition 
of the traditional referent in terms of formal characteristics is thus 
unnecessary, primarily because the formal characteristics of the referent are 
determined by the particular network of associations in which it operates.  
Depending upon the makeup of the memes that are being referenced and the 
larger network of associations in which they exist, different features of 
language, style, image, and so on will be “marked” and will work as 
traditional referents. The technical term for this specificity is “tradition-
dependence.”
30
 
This is a complex but necessary way of approaching the problem of 
style. A style is a network of traditional referents and associated memes that 
are recognizable as being related.
31
 In many cases the traditional referents to 
the style will be so subtle and the network so distributed that we may find it 
difficult to articulate our reasons for seeing one work as included in a style 
while another very similar work is not. Styles can be conceived of as a series 
of ever-larger nested sets. The individual style of all the works of James 
Joyce might be subsumed in the larger set of all the works of early 
twentieth-century, English-speaking modernists, which might be included in 
                                                
29
 Here my approach contrasts with that of Foley and others working on oral 
tradition and performance studies. The oral traditionalists focus on the notion of 
performance as being the “enabling event” that informs readers/hearers that they should 
“interpret what I say in some special sense; do not take it to mean what the words alone, 
taken literally, would convey” (Bauman 1977:9). Foley, Bauman, and others are 
undoubtedly correct in noting that the performance arena serves to suggest to 
hearers/readers that they recognize utterances in that arena as being specially marked.  
My point is that this process is not limited to performance, but can also include other 
social contexts, textual presentation and layout, and even verbal style; performance is 
merely one important subset of the patterns by which human brains recognize traditional 
referents. See further Foley 1995:28. 
 
30
 Failure to recognize the tradition-dependence of the formulaic style has led to 
logically flawed analysis of Anglo-Saxon texts in terms of other oral traditions (such as 
Benson 1966; for a critique of Benson see Foley 1995:75, n. 32). Certain features in 
certain traditions probably cannot be “marked” due to their potential to be swamped by 
an unfavorable signal-to-noise ratio. Thus standard grammatical features such as articles 
or pronouns (in Modern English; Old English dual forms may in fact be marked) 
probably cannot become traditional referents because there are simply too many of them 
in any given collection of sentences. 
 
31
 My use of “style” is basically equivalent to Foley’s use of the more technical 
term “register” (1995:49-54). Foley intentionally limits the notion of register to 
traditional oral performances. I want to point out that style works the same way in many 
other contexts. For a technical definition of register, see Halliday 1978:111.  
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turn in the set of all twentieth-century, English-speaking writers.
32
 Other sets 
of relationships may be noted by comparing Joyce’s style to that of other 
Irish writers, or other men, or other members of his circle of friends. These 
sets of relationships may be further ramified by subsequent writers who 
adopt the style of Joyce (by reproducing some of the same memes).  
The recognition of style is possible due to the repetition of elements 
(traditional referents and the traditions they refer to), which leads to the 
recognition of similarities. The network of meanings established by the 
traditional referents can eventually become completely free-floating: 
traditional referents can refer to other traditional referents in relationships 
that, once established, do not need to be tied to any existing tradition. The 
referent is not only a signifier that is linked to the existing tradition to which 
it refers; the process of cultural evolution can create networks on top of 
networks on top of networks, thus making it potentially very difficult to 
move from signifier to signified.
33
  
A traditional referent need not be a specific word, phrase, or formula 
but can amount to the use of certain grammatical constructions in certain 
situations (“a figure of grammar”) or the tendency to use long or short 
sentences or to invert subjects and verbs or any other feature that serves to 
mark the text in the minds of readers or hearers.
34
 The diffusion of the 
marked elements throughout the network of associations that makes up the 
style is limited only by the pattern-recognition abilities of the brain. 
Someone with a good “eye” can pick up on patterns (repetitions) among two 
                                                
32
 Within the “style of James Joyce” set there might be subsets of “early Joyce,” 
“later Joyce,” “Joyce writing on days during which he had read Dante,” and so on. The 
subdivisions, because they are products of post-facto analysis, can be infinitely fine-
grained. 
 
33
 This analysis appears to contradict Foley’s contention that oral theory 
presupposes that signifiers are linked to signifieds (1991a:xiv), but Foley is explaining 
how traditional referents would work for original participants in the tradition, while I am 
trying to show how they work in general. Foley explains how oral traditional texts can 
“speak to readers who hear”; I am explaining how texts speak also to readers who do not 
know how to listen, those who are ignorant or partially ignorant of the tradition, as well 
as those who are full participants in the tradition. From the point of view of any one 
individual in any one tradition, the signifiers of traditional referents do in fact link to 
signifieds: whatever the individual believes the meaning of the signifier to be, whatever 
associations it metonymically invokes, may be the signified. My analysis points out that 
the networks of signifieds that undergird the system can in themselves be signifiers of 
another system because conjoined meme complexes can exist at a nearly infinite number 
of nested and interpenetrating levels. 
 
34
 For syntax as marking allusions in Latin poetry, see Wills 1996:15.  
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paintings that are not necessarily known to be related to each other and find 
that they were created by the same artist, or by an artist and his or her 
teacher. Style, then, is in the eye (and ear) of the beholder. Regardless of 
what the traditional referent is, the way it works is the same: it invokes the 
entire larger tradition.
35
  
If the tradition referenced by the style is large, no one will be able to 
hold it completely in working memory. One may be able to recognize the 
style of James Joyce from a small sample of text (the traditional referent), 
but that does not mean that the entire texts of Dubliners, Portrait of the 
Artist as a Young Man, Ulysses, and Finnegans Wake are transferred into 
working memory. Rather, some reasonable subset of the diagnostic features 
of that tradition exists in the working memories of a diffuse network of 
individuals and in the textual record. This memory of the tradition must be 
encoded in radically compressed or abstracted forms. Thus different 
individuals reading the phrase “forge in the smithy of my soul” may 
reference different parts of the tradition.
36
 The tradition so referenced, via 
the metonymic power of traditional referents, then, is the population of 
tradition-fragments and elements—along with the traditional referents that 
are associated with them—that is spread through all the various human 
minds that have been exposed to enough of the memes in the tradition to be 
able to recognize the style.
37
 That the tradition is a population of things 
being remembered, written, and talked about by various individuals does not 
make it any less real.
38
  
To review, any functioning tradition produces patterns via repetition. 
Humans recognize these patterns, and therefore the traditions that generate 
them can be invoked metonymically via traditional referentiality. Traditional 
referentiality mnemonically reinforces the tradition to which it refers and 
                                                
35
 Note also that “style” therefore does not need to be under the conscious control 
of an author.  
 
36
 Some individuals may even pull up the “wrong” tradition, confusing Joyce with 
later imitators or with, say, Morrison or Faulkner or some other Modernist writer.  
 
37
 Cf. Foley 1991a:xv: “any single performance merely instances an unexpressed, 
and inexpressible, whole, a larger story that will forever remain beyond the reach of 
acoustically recorded, oral-dictated, or even written textualization.” 
 
38
 Wittgenstein’s concept of “family resemblances” is useful for explaining how 
we sort out the various memes in the population into somewhat discrete traditions, but 
this fallback position merely shows that the “essence” of a tradition is a post-facto 
construction, not a natural kind: we can come up with rules for recognizing and 
delimiting traditions, but any groups we define are likely to be fuzzy around the edges.   
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also reinforces the link between the tradition and the referent. Thus 
traditions that are particularly good at producing repetition, and those that 
are particularly good at throwing off traditional referents (having consistent 
recognizable parts) are more likely to maintain themselves and to be 
replicated. Memes that are able to become linked to such traditions are 
themselves more likely to be replicated. And because very subtle variations 
in style can become traditional referents, memes that can imitate certain 
already established styles are themselves more likely to be replicated. Thus, 
all else being equal, memes that imitate a traditional style are more likely to 
be replicated than memes that do not. A meme’s imitation of a traditional 
style, which parasitizes an existing tradition and joins the meme to that 
tradition, is a version of the same process by which meme-plexes utilizing 
the Universal Tradition Meme or the Unconscious Imperative become 
conjoined. Networks of traditional referentiality, generated by the repetitions 
created by tradition, thus provide a niche for parasitic imitative memes. This 
process creates additional selection pressure on memes to evolve into 
harmony with the existing traditional style.  
So while there is no reason to discount the fact that individual writers 
intentionally imitate authoritative styles, from a meme’s point of view 
whether or not the imitation is deliberate is beside the point.
39
 Something 
that imitates the traditional style is simply (in the right context) more likely 
to be replicated. Note that the Word-to-World fit constraints we have 
previously discussed are still operational. Memes that clash with ideology, 
aesthetics, or mnemonic tendencies violate the Word-to-World fit condition 
and are unsuccessful. But when the parasitic meme is sufficiently “fit,” it 
can get itself incorporated into the network of referents by imitating an 
already existing style.   
Traditional referentiality thus explains the persistence of formulaic 
elements even long after the oral component of a traditional text has been 
eliminated by textual copying and reading. It also shows some of the ways 
that memes may spread themselves from one mind to another and integrate 
themselves into a culture. Traditional referentiality, and the poetics 
developed from this notion by Foley and others, also links memetics and 
mnemonics: not only are memes that are mnemonically stable more likely to 
be propagated, but those memes that are linked to other mnemonically 
                                                
39
 And in fact a memetic analysis need not discount intentional imitation at all.  
We simply need to note that in memetic terms “authority” is the tendency to be 
replicated. Writers adopt a certain style because they want people to enjoy what they 
write, believe it (copy it into their memories), act as if it is true (increase its Word-to-
World fitness), and spread it to other people. From a meme’s point of view, then, 
whatever style is authoritative is simply an improvement in its memetic fitness. 
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important elements are more likely to be able to be re-transmitted and thus 
spread to other individuals. Thus this cultural poetics helps to explain how 
information gets put into and accessed from what Maurice Halbwachs in 
1950 called the “collective memory.”
40
   
 
 
Anaphora 
 
Foley has discussed the way traditions create the effect of what he 
terms “anaphora” (1991a:9-10). As a poetic figure, anaphora is used to 
describe the repetition of elements at the beginning of a poetic unit. For 
example, the Anglo-Saxon poems “The Gifts of Men” and “The Fortunes of 
Men” both contain long lists of potential outcomes for human lives, each of 
which is introduced by some variant of the words sum sceal (“a certain one 
shall”), followed by a description of the specific outcome.
41
 Likewise in 
Runo 10 of the Finnish Kalevala, which describes the forging of the 
enigmatic Sampo, the Smith Ilmarinen repeats the same actions over several 
days.  Each stanza begins and ends with repeated actions: Ilmarinen looks at 
the underside of the forge, removes an object (a crossbow, a boat, a heifer), 
then is unsatisfied, breaks the object, and pushes it back into the fire.
42
 
                                                
40
 I invoke Halbwachs (1950/1980) here not because I agree with his analysis, but 
because his phrase “collective memory” has been so influential. One of the great benefits 
of memetics is that it enables us to replace fuzzy “collective” abstractions with a more 
philosophically rigorous analysis of populations of memes in populations of individuals. 
Rather than a collective memory, which is a nebulous term, we can instead note that there 
are specific memories (memes) in the minds of various specific people in a social group. 
If an individual has not encountered the meme in question, he or she has no memory of it. 
The “collective memory” (if we must keep the term) is then made up of only those 
individuals whose brains contain the meme in question, but it is still not in any real sense 
“collective,” because it is not clear that all the individuals share the full context and 
content of each others’ memories. In fact, as traditional referentiality shows, the situation 
is more complex because individuals may have more or less of the total cultural context 
of a meme-plex activated by traditional referentiality. 
 
41
 For example, lines 67-71 from “Fortunes of Men” (Krapp and Dobbie 1936:63-
64, my translation): “To one, wealth; to one a share of miseries. To one glad youth; to 
one glory in war, mastery in battle. To one skill at throwing or shooting and glorious 
fame, to one dice-skill, talent at chess.” These poems are not oral, but they are certainly 
traditional (cf. Howe 1985).   
 
42
 Kaukonen 1956; for an English translation, see Bosley 1989:114-17. I 
recognize that the Kalevala is not a primarily oral traditional text because it was greatly 
revised and re-worked by Elias Lönnrot, but the ontological status of the Kalevala is not 
particularly relevant for this portion of the argument, and the particular section of 
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Similarly, in the South Slavic narodna pjesma about Marko Kraljevi? 
entitled “Marko drinks wine during Ramazan,” the same list of prohibitions 
and Marko’s violations of those prohibitions are repeated while the actions 
between the repetitions varies (Foley 1983). And in the Zuni tale “The 
Women and the Man,” the repeated greetings and colloquies with each of the 
animals (mountain lion, bear, badger, eagle, crow, mole, hawk, owl) are not 
used for the coyote (Tedlock 1972:87-132).
43
 These repeated constructions 
are examples of anaphora, and the repetition serves to link together the non-
recurring parts of each poetic unit as well as the repeated elements.   
Foley’s description of anaphora extends beyond the poetic line into 
formula, scene, and theme. Because the repetition in a tradition creates 
anaphoric effects, readers who are literate in the tradition end up reading 
differently than readers who are not. Encountering the repeated initial 
element, the reader who participates in the tradition is able to infer the rest of 
the unit via the metonymic process of traditional referentiality (Foley 
1995:13). So when readers encounter a type-scene that they have previously 
encountered in an oral traditional poem—for example, the “beasts of battle” 
or “hero on the beach” in Anglo-Saxon, the “shouting in prison” theme in 
South Slavic oral epic, or the feasting scene in Homeric Greek epic (Foley 
1991:33-35)—they can bring to mind the other “conclusions” to the 
anaphoric line, formula, or scene that had obtained. The presence of 
anaphoric elements thus causes readers not only to “fill in the gaps” in the 
current text with the traditional elements invoked by traditional 
referentiality, but also to forecast the shape of portions of the narrative that 
they have not yet encountered.  
Anaphora also provides a means by which a parasitic meme that is 
contradictory to something elsewhere in the meme complex may 
nevertheless get itself incorporated into that complex. An otherwise 
conflicting or non-traditional meme that is similar in form to the anaphoric 
elements of an existing style can be included in a meme even if it did not 
organically evolve as a traditional referent for the elements that it invokes 
via anaphora. Because an existing style is, by definition, sufficiently fit to 
have spread through a culture via tradition and repetition, imitating that style 
is a strategy with a high likelihood of success. Using a traditional style 
creates an anaphoric environment that reduces cognitive demands (that is, 
                                                                                                                                            
interest, the forging of the Sampo, is not under suspicion as having been invented by 
Lönnrot (see Kaukonen 1956).  
 
43
 The use of anaphora in these widely varying traditions supports the idea that 
anaphora is a feature of tradition in general, since there is no genetic connection or direct 
influence among the specific traditions noted above.  
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the reader knows what to expect next) and it is an effective strategy for a 
meme to get itself copied. And there are other good reasons that memes that 
imitate a traditional style are likely to be copied. A new meme is, by 
definition, not part of an existing traditional complex of memes. Thus a new 
meme in the process of parasitizing an existing tradition needs to disguise 
itself.  Imitation is a very effective form of disguise.   
In the Anglo-Saxon “The Gifts of Men,” the Latinate catalogue form 
(Howe 1985:108-9) of the poem is filled mostly with traditional, Germanic 
skills, gifts, or talents (Russom 1978). The catalogue is characterized by the 
use of distributive sum (“a certain one”) followed by a description of the 
individual’s particular talents. This formula, which is obviously anaphoric, is 
repeated 40 times in the poem. The great majority of the descriptions are in 
fact traditional Germanic, aristocratic skills such as swimming, fighting, and 
horsemanship. But in the last section of the catalogue these warrior attributes 
are augmented with five sentences, still in the “sum x” form, in which the 
gifts and skills are obviously Christian and perhaps even monastic (lines 86-
96): 
 
Sum her geornlice  gæstes ?earfe  
mode bewinde?,  ond him metudes est 
ofer eor?welan ealne geceose?. 
Sum bi? deormod  deofles gewinnes,  
bi? a wi? firenum  in gefeoht gearo. 
Sum cræft hafa?  circnytta fela,  
mæg on lofsongum lifes waldend  
hlude hergan,   hafa? healice  
beorhte stefne.  Sum bi? boca gleaw,  
larum leo?ufæst. Sum bi? listhendig  
to awritanne   wordgeryno. 
 
One here eagerly embraces in mind the needs of the spirit, and he chooses 
for himself the favor of God over all the earth-riches. One is brave-minded 
in devil-struggles, is always ready in the fight against sins. One has 
strength in many church duties, is able to praise loudly the Ruler of life 
with praise-songs, has an elevated, bright voice. One is book-wise, lay-fast 
in lore. One is skillful at writing word-mysteries.
44
 
 
Here we see how anaphora enables one very elaborate complex of 
memes (Benedictine Reformed monasticism) to incorporate itself into 
                                                
44
 Text from Krapp and Dobbie (1936:139-40); translations are my own.  
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another tradition (the Germanic catalogue of aristocratic gifts and talents).
45
  
The recurrent anaphoric element, the “sum x” formula, is easily repeated, 
with new material readily incorporated into what would appear to be—even 
to a primary participant in the tradition—a traditional form.   
Anaphora also requires less memory to store the same length of poem: 
the repeated element only needs to be stored one time and then can be 
accessed in the form of repeated element + novel element, where the entire 
repeated element needs only to be stored one time regardless of how many 
iterations of it are used.
46
 This communicative economy also enables 
memetic parasitism and hybridization, as new memes and complexes of 
memes attach themselves to existing meme-plexes by being incorporated 
into the existing forms. Anaphora and traditional referentiality, then, help to 
generate stylistic inertia because the imitation of style is a way for memes to 
increase the likelihood that they will be replicated and passed from mind to 
mind. In fact, one characteristic of traditions, particularly oral traditions, is 
their stylistic conservatism: this is one of the ways we recognize traditions.  
But we should not expect to see no changes in style whatsoever. To be 
reproduced, memes must find ways to be imitated. While mimicking an 
existing style is one way to accomplish this goal, it also risks leaving the 
mimic unnoticed and therefore unimitated and unreproduced. There are 
therefore advantages to standing out just as there are advantages to going 
unnoticed. The successful meme negotiates a balancing act between making 
itself a very noticeable signal and hiding in the noise, and that balancing act 
must change over time, because the presence of new memes and new minds 
and new combinations of memes and traditions is constantly changing the 
memetic landscape, making memes that were adaptive today maladaptive 
tomorrow.  Styles are therefore likely to develop via hybridization, as some 
memes incorporate themselves anaphorically, while the major elements of 
the style remain.  
 
 
Repetition of Metrical Patterns 
 
One of the major features of any traditional poetic style is meter, 
however construed (whether by stress, quantity, syllable count, and other 
                                                
45
 I discuss the Benedictine Reform connections of this poem in much greater 
detail in Drout 2006:242-50.  
 
46
 It is this form of communicative economy that enables a reasonably long 
children’s story, Green Eggs and Ham by Dr. Seuss, to consist of only 50 different 
words. 
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tradition-dependent criteria).
47
 Meter serves as an important feature of 
poetic, traditional language that marks it as belonging to a special category. 
It thus promotes, in the case of traditions, recognition of that tradition. The 
recognitio component of the traditional poetic meme-plex can be: 
 
Recognitio: when you hear metrical language,  
Actio: interpret the words as important, traditional poetry.  
 
If the meter is a marked feature of the poetry, then it is likely to be imitated, 
and in fact this is exactly what we see across oral traditions: meter is 
strongly conserved, so strongly, in fact, that conservation of meter is taken 
as one of the tests of traditionality of poetry.  
Our meme-based theory can explain how such strongly conserved 
metrical patterns may have arisen. Meme-theory interprets the memetic 
ecosystem (human culture) as arising from differential imitation of human 
behaviors. Imitation spreads memes throughout cultures and causes them to 
evolve according to Word-to-World fit conditions. If the foundational 
imperative of tradition is to imitate, then we can expect to find people 
imitating the speech of others. Let us assume that a prestigious or talented 
individual makes up a phrase that is imitated by others, and that imitation 
first occurs as direct copying of the word or phrase. When there is direct 
imitation, the copying manifests very high fidelity, but as the copying 
spreads throughout a human group, people who did not hear the original do 
not necessarily know what exactly they are copying; they do not know if 
they are copying the entire phrase or some aspect of the phrase such as its 
intonation. Some feature of the phrase could then be imitated and spread 
even if the original phrase was no longer being copied exactly. Those 
features would then become marked and would be more likely to be copied.  
If a new phrase mimicked those particular features, even if it was not similar 
to the original phrase in any other aspects, it too could be copied. Thus 
marked features of the original phrase could provide a pathway that other 
phrases could imitate in order to be successfully copied. If the marked 
elements of the original phrase happened to be its stress patterns, then 
repetition of those particular stress patterns would be the origin of a metrical 
tradition.
48
   
                                                
47
 The scholarly literature on meter in various traditions is vast and far beyond the 
scope of this study. Even in the more narrow field of metrics in Anglo-Saxon, Middle 
English, and Modern English a massive bibliography exists; I have found Woods 1985, 
Bliss 1962, and Fulk 1992 to be particularly helpful guides.  
 
48
 These metrical traditions are obviously language-dependent as well as being 
tradition-dependent: a language (such as Japanese) that is not stress-based, for instance, 
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Metrists will note that I have just reinvented the “Word/Foot” theory 
of Germanic metrics. Word/Foot theory postulates that all allowable metrical 
patterns in Germanic poetry arise from the abstracted metrical profiles of 
allowable words in the language (Russom 1987). Although metrics is a 
particularly contentious field, with many scholars supporting Eduard 
Sievers’ (1893) theory of “types” (allowable lines) for Germanic meter, 
Word/Foot theory has the benefit of explaining how repeated metrical 
patterns might arise with Germanic languages and at the root of Germanic 
poetic traditions.   
The combination of memetics and Word/Foot can explain the 
evolution of metrical patterns, even the Sievers Types. A word’s stress 
profile provides a template for a particular foot. Once these templates are 
integrated into a tradition, their imitation will produce “types” founded on 
the metrical profile of the original word even if that original word has been 
forgotten. A Sievers Type is merely an abstracted pattern that is being 
imitated (regardless of how that pattern was originally generated). Memetics 
and Word/Foot thus show how an underlying simple process of imitation can 
generate the sophisticated and conserved metrical patterns that characterize  
traditional poetry.
49
 Thus there appears to be a consilience between meme 
theory and a pre-existing, well-developed approach to understanding the 
genesis of metrical patterns.   
This evolutionary speculation supports the idea that specific metrical 
patterns are traditional referents, but rather than referring to some particular 
content of the tradition they invoke the tradition in broad terms. There is no 
evidence that a Sievers Type A line, for example, is a traditional reference to 
any one part of the Beowulfian epic tradition (although there is much 
speculation that hypermetrical lines may have had a traditional association, 
there is no agreement as to what that association might be). Particular meters 
also mark specific traditional genres in traditions other than Old English. For 
example, the “heroic decasyllable” or juna?ki deseterac marks South Slavic 
oral epic; likewise the “Homeric hexameter” (Foley 1990:61, 85). When 
someone begins to sing in the meter of Beowulf or in Kalevala meter, 
expectations and pre-existing knowledge are invoked in the audience (here is 
an epic and these sorts of things are likely to happen), in the same way that 
“Beowulf ma?elode, bearn Ecg?eowes” (“Beowulf spoke, son of 
                                                                                                                                            
will not develop stress-based poetry but will instead use other formal criteria, such as 
syllable-counting.  
 
49
 I also want to note that I arrived at this theory independently of my original 
knowledge of metrics (which was scant) and my knowledge of Word/Foot (which was 
even more limited). 
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Ecgtheow”) or “Vaka vanha Väinämöinen” (“steady old Väinämöinen”) 
invokes, pars pro toto, the epic personae of the two characters. The part is 
the traditional, metrical pattern, abstracted from the metrical patterns of 
allowable words. The whole is the metrically bound tradition.    
 
 
Conclusions  
 
Meme-theory as I have discussed it above can explain three separate 
and distinct phenomena of oral tradition: traditional referentiality, anaphora, 
and the repetition of metrical patterns. The theory, even in these early stages, 
thus appears to demonstrate a Zussamenhang or consilience. If meme-theory 
is correct in its general contours, then a literary scholarship built on the 
theory could serve as an additional fruitful approach toward understanding 
oral- traditional artforms.  
A criticism based on memetics would give us additional ways in 
which to “read an oral poem.” The approach of oral traditional scholarship—
understanding the aesthetics of oral traditions as perceived by participants in 
the traditions—is the absolutely essential first move toward a more complete 
understanding of oral traditions. The next step is the analysis of oral 
traditions in terms of some underlying principles. This can be accomplished 
using memetics, which can decompose traditions into their component parts 
and explain how these parts combine, recombine, mutate, and remain stable. 
Reading oral traditional literature in light of memetics suggests ways to 
argue whether or not something was aesthetically successful even from 
outside the tradition by examining what memes turned out to be most 
frequently copied or adapted and by investigating the ways in which they 
were adapted. This approach is in fact essential (and already practiced, 
though perhaps not consciously) when dealing with traditions in which no 
living participants remain (Homeric Greek, Old English). Memetics does not 
provide a prescriptive aesthetics, but when applied to literature from the past 
a memetic aesthetics at least provides us some small scaffolding upon which 
to base aesthetic judgments. 
I am hopeful that the time is right for the development of a cultural 
version of the neo-Darwinian synthesis, a synthesis of the study of culture 
that brings together the disparate observations of various fields and shows 
that they are all variations of the same underlying processes. To my mind 
memetics is thus far the closest anyone has come to finding such an 
explanation for human culture. Memes are the atoms and their combinations 
are the molecules of culture, and, now that they have been recognized, our 
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next task is to figure out the regularities by which they mix and recombine in 
the continually evolving chemistry of the cultural world.
50
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